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The new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and 
the EEAS have emerged after the Lisbon Treaty as a potential driving force in European 
foreign policy. This article critically reviews the first two years of the existence of the EEAS 
to find out whether these new players have managed to shape the direction of the European 
Union’s (EU) external activities. Building on a typology of agenda-setting strategies in the 
EU developed by Princen (2011), it successively examines how the HR and the EEAS have 
been trying to ‘build credibility’ and ‘to gain attention’ for their priorities. The empirical 
analysis shows that priority has been given to addressing the ‘credibility challenge’, with a 
particular emphasis on capacity building. The strategies of mobilising partners and arousing 
interest through framing still leave scope for improvement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the sensitive Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) pre-Lisbon was that it was the member states, rather than the European 
Commission, acting as the motor of cooperation and integration. The national capitals wanted 
to keep a firm grip on the direction of foreign policy. In practice, the agenda was set by the 
six-monthly rotating Presidency. While having the advantage of bringing new impulses, the 
major flaw of the rotating chair system was lack of continuity and direction.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty aimed to do address the continuity and leadership problems by installing a 
longer-term chair both at the level of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC). The latter is the dual-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, who besides chairing the FAC is also Vice-President of the European 
Commission. She is assisted by her own foreign policy administration, the EEAS. Like the 
member states, the HR has the right to put forward foreign policy proposals.  
 
This article addresses the question of how the post-Lisbon institutional structure has affected 
the process of agenda setting and to what extent the HR and her staff have taken over from the 
rotating Presidency as an engine behind initiatives in European foreign policy. The main 
focus is not on questions of strategic direction, formally decided at the highest level of the 
European Council, but on the so-called ‘decision agenda’ of the FAC and its underlying 
bureaucracies. Rather than the long-tem structural questions, these are the issues on which a 
concrete decision can be taken (Kingdon 1994). 
 
Following an introductory section on agenda setting in foreign policy more broadly, we 
successively examine the formal and informal practices pre-Lisbon and present the main 
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changes introduced by the new Treaty. Secondly, building on a typology of agenda-setting 
strategies in the EU developed by Princen (2011), we examine how, in the first two and a half 
years of Ashton’s office (2010 - June 2012), the HR and the Brussels-based EEAS have been 
building capacity, claiming authority, mobilising support, and arousing interest.i Although we 
will also make reference to the 140 Union delegations as an important pillar of the EEAS, 
their role in the agenda-setting process is outside the scope of this article.   
  
AGENDA-SETTING IN FOREIGN POLICY 
Agenda setting is the first and indispensable phase in any policy-making process. While some 
issues may emerge automatically consequent to prior commitments, many others never 
materialise, or only appear after a lengthy process of trial and error. In his seminal work on 
‘Agendas, alternatives and public policies’, Kingdon (1994) has pointed to the key role of 
policy entrepreneurs able to couple policy proposals to emerging problems and take 
advantage of a positive political mood. He defined them as ‘advocates who are willing to 
invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for 
anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits (Kingdon, 
1994: 179). 
   
There is not much literature specifically focusing on agenda setting in foreign policy. The few 
existing studies mainly focus on the US, looking into the role of the President (see e.g. Wood 
and Peake 1998; Birkland 1997). Tallberg’s study on the agenda-shaping powers of the 
Council Presidency in the EU context includes foreign policy examples but is much broader 
in scope (Tallberg 2003). As already stated by Wood and Peake (1998: 173), ‘foreign policy 
does not readily fit the theoretical mold most scholars associate with domestic issues.’ 
Although many concepts and mechanisms developed to get a better insight in public 
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policymaking are relevant, there are also peculiarities to be taken into account. While the role 
of policy entrepreneurs in foreign policy is also crucial, the agenda is set to a large extend by 
crisis events, or what Kingdon (1994) calls ‘focusing events’. The fall of a regime, a terrorist 
attack and human rights violations all require a prompt response and impose themselves on 
the agenda, often surpassing other issues that work their way up (Princen and Rhinard 2006). 
In such cases, issues often arise much more quickly than in other policy sectors. Another 
difference is that the policy-making process is much more insulated or even lacking 
transparency, with governments trying to sideline parliaments. Although advocacy groups 
also matter in foreign policy, their role differs widely and takes a broad variety of forms such 
as third states and international organisations, or NGOs with a particular foreign policy 
agenda (see e.g. Joachim and Dembinski, 2011). For a majority of the larger public, foreign 
policy tends to be of remote interest but in highly salient issues such as situations of mass 
starvation and emerging wars, it can be an important force for new policies.  
 
In their search for a better grasp of the factors contributing to issues acquiring agenda status 
scholars have identified a variety of strategies such as venue shopping and framing (f.e. 
Schattenschneider 1960; Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976; Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Princen 
2011). When venue shopping, strategic players try to identify the venue that offers them the 
best chances to advance their goals. In a system of multilevel governance such as in the EU, 
the potential number of venues is considerable, triggering Peters (2001) to call it an ‘agenda-
setting paradise’. This approach has to be nuanced in the intergovernmental area of CFSP, 
where the principal decision-maker continues to be the Council. The importance of framing in 
the construction of new agenda issues is well known. By emphasizing certain values and 
facts, policy entrepreneurs will search to attract attention and try to induce their audience to 
look at issues from their preferred perspective. In the field of foreign policy, it makes a big 
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difference whether an issue is framed in security, diplomacy or development terms. The 
choice of the wording will not only affect the venue where the issue will be discussed, it will 
also have important implications for the instruments used to address the problem. 
 
In this research we make use of a typology of agenda-setting strategies in EU policy-
processes developed by Princen (2011), but also identified in earlier analyses of Council 
Presidencies conducted by Tallberg (2003, 2004), and recently applied by Stephenson in the 
transport field (2012). Starting from the assumption that agenda-setters face the two main 
challenges of ‘gaining attention’ and ‘building credibility’, and can potentially affect both 
venues and frames, Princen has developed a typology of four strategies: mobilising support, 
arousing interest, claiming authority and building capacity. Below we briefly describe the 
different categories, translating them to the field of foreign policy and illustrating them with 
European foreign policy examples. 
 
Gaining attention 
A key challenge for any policy entrepreneur aiming to put an issue on the agenda is to gain 
attention for it. The two main strategies concern the control of participation (mobilising 
support) and the framing of the topic (arousing interest).  
 
a. Mobilising Support is all about the involvement and exclusion of different actors. This may 
be attempted through various strategies, including horizontal (between different EU bodies) 
and vertical venue shopping. Given the sensitive character of European foreign policy and the 
central role of the Council, horizontal venue shopping is generally more difficult here than in 
other policy areas, but it is not impossible. For example, by mobilising ‘development 
policymakers’, an issue will be subject to a different decision making procedure than when 
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discussed as an intergovernmental CFSP matter. Players can also shop between vertical levels 
of decision making, i.e. the national, EU and international level (such as the UN, NATO or 
the OCSE).  
 
b. Arousing interest. The success in mobilising supporters often depends on the way a 
problem is defined and framed. Interest in the issue can be aroused either by using ‘big 
words’ or by a small-step approach. In the first case, agenda-setters may try to link a foreign 
issue to a big moral cause or to the EU’s long tradition as a soft power, strong in the 
promotion of human rights and multilateral solutions. The small-step approach is more time-
consuming and tends to focus on the more detailed and technical aspects of a dossier. It 
makes use of a variety of instruments such as the presentation of studies, the organisation of 




Given the parallel existence of several venues to discuss foreign policy issues, it is important 
that the proposed venue is credible both in terms of organisational capacity as well as in terms 
of legal competencies and expertise. 
 
a. Building Capacity. A key condition in becoming accepted as an actor in a particular 
domain is possession of the required organisational capacities. In foreign policy, EU member 
states have been reticent to equip ‘Brussels’ with the required bureaucratic resources and have 
been managing policy cooperation through the national capitals. The establishment of the 
EEAS is therefore a significant milestone. The literature also includes the mobilisation of 
capacities of outside players as being part of the capacity-building exercise. 
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b. Claiming authority. Building credibility may involve framing an issue in ‘EU’-terms, i.e. 
justifying why it should be dealt with at the EU-level. Important sources of authority are not 
only the legal competencies of an actor but also their expertise in a particular issue. In a 
complex institutional arena such as the EU it is not only important to possess content 
expertise but also to have staff with a good understanding of the relevant procedures and 
developed negotiation skills. 
 
AGENDA-SETTING IN CFSP 
For most of its history, the process of foreign policy initiation has been ad hoc. As there was 
no general agreement on a strategic agenda, rotating Presidencies were tempted to (ab)use 
their period in the chair to get on their national hobbyhorses. Once their term was over, there 
was often no follow-up. The European Commission, which could have functioned as a source 
of continuity, was careful not to step on member states’ toes and was reticent to use its right 
of policy initiative (Nuttall 2000).The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) brought foreign policy 
entrepreneurship from an unexpected corner. Formally, the new High Representative for 
CFSP, based at the Council General Secretariat, did not have an autonomous role. The first 
occupant of the position, the highly experienced former Spanish foreign minister Solana 
(1999-2009), managed to gain the trust of the national capitals and succeeded in carving out a 
political role for himself and informally affecting the agenda-setting process (Spence 2006; 
Dijkstra forthcoming). 
 
The Lisbon Treaty considerably strengthened the potential role of the High Representative as 
foreign policy entrepreneur. Formally, the HR is now an autonomous player  who can submit 
proposals and fulfil an implementing and representational role. In the area of CFSP, she 
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shares the right to put forward proposals with the member states (Art. 30.1, TEU). In the other 
areas of EU external action, she can submit joint proposals together with the European 
Commission (Art.22.2, TEU). 
 
 Having the formal right of initiative is an important asset but not a guarantee to successfully 
policy initiation. This also depends on other factors, such as institutional rules, and the 
preferences and eagerness of other players to reach an agreement (Pollack 1997). The 
policymaking rules in CFSP, where decisions are adopted by unanimous consensus, are 
definitely a constraining factor for any agenda-setter. This does not mean that the de facto 
agenda-setting role of the HR is condemned to be minimal. There are at least three factors that 
give her some scope for having an impact. The new incumbent has a potentially very 
powerful source of information and expertise at her disposal – her own foreign policy 
administration. Besides the Brussels-based EEAS, this includes the 140 EU Delegations all 
over the world, regularly reporting developments in third countries and international 
organisations such as the United Nations (Drieskens 2012). Secondly, as chair of CFSP 
working groups, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Council, Ashton and her 
staff are in a privileged position to put new issues on the table and to steer discussions. They 
also have the advantage that they occupy long-term positions. Already in mid-2012, the HR 
was among those who had the longest experience at the FAC table. A final factor is the 
‘crisis-like’ character of CFSP. Crisis situations require a quick response and limited time-
horizons to reach an agreement may be to the advantage of the chair. 
 
The remainder of this article examines whether and how the HR and her staff have been 
giving shape to their new agenda-setting role. In line with the model introduced earlier, we 
show how Catherine Ashton and the EEAS have tried to build up credibility and gain 
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attention in a variety of different foreign policy issues. Since the HR was new in her position 
and still had to build up her service, we start with the challenge of building credibility and the 
strategies of capacity building and claiming authority. As a next step we look at how Ashton 
and the EEAS have tried to gain attention for particular foreign policy issues by mobilising 
supporters and arousing interest. 
 
Table 1. Agenda setting Strategies in the EU (Adapted from Princen 2011) 
Challenges Venue Strategies Framing Strategies 
Building Credibility Capacity building Claiming Authority 




Building credibility is a challenge for any player engaging in policy initiation. In the case of 
Ashton and the EEAS, the challenge was particularly demanding. As newcomers, they could 
only partially fall back on earlier established practices and procedures. The next section 
examines which strategies they have been using in building up capacities and claiming 
authority. 
 
Capacity building  
The effectiveness of any political actor in achieving their priorities depends as much on their 
personal qualities as on the strength of the administrative resources available to them. It is 
therefore not surprising that Ashton considered the set-up of the external service as ‘a top 
priority and not just a bureaucratic exercise’ii (EP hearing, 11 January 2010). To this end she 
devoted a big part of her first six months in office, negotiating over the shape of the new 
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service with member states, the EP and the European Commission. By June the different 
institutions had reached the general agreement that led to a Council framework decision 
outlining the EEAS organisational structure (Council Decision 2010). Following a deal on the 
budget and financial and staff regulations, the EEAS was officially launched in December 
2010. The negotiation process was not always easy but overall the first phase of creating the 
new body went relatively smoothly, thanks largely to Ashton’s strong negotiation skills and 
determination (Christoffersen 2011; Howorth 2011).  
 
The Treaty foresaw that the EEAS staff would be drawn from civil servants of the European 
Commission, the Council Secretariat and national diplomats. The first two groups, transferred 
en masse in December 2010 from DG Relex (585 officials) and from parts of DG 
Development (93 officials) of the European Commission and DG External and Politico-
Military Affairs of the Council Secretariat (411 officials). They joined the service 
immediately in January 2010 while the third category of national diplomats was employed 
through a huge recruitment round (Hemra et al. 2011). This process turned out to be rather 
problematic, partly because capitals fiercely lobbied for catapulting their nationals into senior 
positions, but also because nominations were delayed due to the HR’s micromanagement 
(Interview no. 4). In their non-paper to Ashton (December 2011), twelve ministers of foreign 
affairs urgently pledged the HR to streamline these procedures. An additional challenge has 
been the unwillingness of member states to commit more financial resources to the service 
and keeping it ‘budget-neutral’. 
 
Besides the Brussels-based diplomatic corps, the HR can also fall back on the work and 
expertise of the European Union Delegations, potentially a tremendous source of information 
gathering and processing, independent of the member states. These former Commission 
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delegations to third countries and international organisations were expanded with staff from 
the Council Secretariat and national diplomats (Drieskens 2012). In several cases, however, 
the staff of the EEAS is only limited to one (Hemra 2011) and it will still take time before the 
delegations will have adapted to their new political duties both in terms of resources and 
expertise (Duke et al. 2012). 
 
Setting up the EEAS has been consuming much of the energy of the HR and her cabinet in 
their first year in office. It was an indispensable condition for her development into a foreign 
policy entrepreneur. However, solely the creation of an organisational structure and its 
staffing is not sufficient for this development. The next section examines to what extent the 
HR and the EEAS have succeeded to be recognised as authoritative sources of foreign policy. 
 
CLAIMING AUTHORITY 
The Lisbon Treaty makes Brussels a key locus of European diplomatic action and gives the 
HR a central place in all phases of the policy cycle. She is an autonomous playeriii who is 
explicitly encouraged to contribute to CFSP with own proposals. The Treaty on European 
Union refers to this new competence on four different occasions (Art. 18, Art.22, Art. 27 and 
Art. 30). 
 
Legal competencies are, however, only part of the story. A further important source of 
authority is expertise. When assuming her position, the HR had little foreign policy 
experience. Her difficult start in the job quickly showed that her experience as former 
Commissioner for Trade was not enough to compensate for a lack of diplomatic know-how. 
This was illustrated by her rather poor performance during the confirmation hearing before 
the European Parliament in  January 2010 (Vogel 2010) and several misjudgements in setting 
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priorities in the first months (Howorth 2011).iv In spite of this, she chose to staff her private 
office with trade experts from her cabinet as Trade Commissioner rather than with 
experienced and well-connected senior diplomats.  
 
The lack of personal expertise made it all the more important to give top priority to the build-
up of the EEAS and in her first report on the EEAS (Report, December 2011), Ashton refers 
to its establishment as a milestone. On paper, the global coverage of the delegations and the 
bringing together of both European civil servants and national diplomats has a huge potential. 
In practice though there is still much scope for progress and learning, both in terms of content 
and process expertise (Beach 2005). The earlier mentioned non-paper on the EEAS by twelve 
ministers of Foreign Affairs is revealing in this respect (Non-Paper, 8 December 2011). It asks 
for additional, timelier preparatory policy and decision-making papers and encourages the 
service to further develop internal manuals and guidelines. The interviews echoed the need for 
higher quality written work and more professionalism (Interviews 5, 6, 7, 8). National 
diplomats have been repeatedly complaining about last-minute changes to the PSC agenda 
and problems with the timely circulation of documents, including even draft Council 
Conclusions (Interviews 7, 8, 12). Interviewees, both in the member states and in the EEAS, 
have referred to lack of entrepreneurial thinking and a pro-active attitude not only by 
geographical desk-officers, but also at the level of senior management (Interview 5). 
 
Several issues play a role here. Firstly, it has to be taken into account that many of the former 
staff of DG Relex and the Council General Secretariat are not professional diplomats. Former 
Commission officials have very sound knowledge on both the geographical areas and 
horizontal themes but typically have been operating mostly as project managers. Staff coming 
from the national diplomatic services may be highly skilled diplomats but may not always 
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have experience in Brussels (Spence 2012). While it is clear that the different groups have 
plenty to learn from each other, the divergences in knowledge and expertise have further 
complicated the daily management of EU foreign affairs.  
 
Secondly, the EEAS does not yet have a single institutional memory at its disposal. Different 
players come with divergent working methods. Rules and procedures are developed as 
problems present themselves. Last but not least, the new service brings together people from 
different epistemic communities – each with their own mind-set (Spence 2012). For example, 
the hierarchical culture of Commission officials has been clashing with the more horizontal 
work culture of some of the national diplomats (Interview 1). More fundamentally, it cannot 
be taken for granted that the different components of the EEAS have convergent views about 
diplomacy and Europe’s future role in international relations (for more on this see Juncos and 
Pomorska in this volume).  
 
STRATEGIES FOR GAINING ATTENTION 
Since the foreign policy agenda is largely ‘event-led’, many issues compete for the attention 
of policy-makers. In this section we look at how Ashton and the EEAS have been mobilising 
supporters and arousing interest for particular foreign policy issues. 
 
Mobilising supporters 
Effective agenda setting is linked to mobilising supporters, both in the EU and outside. Here 
we focus on the internal supporters within the EU. Since unanimity is still the prevalent 
decision-making rule in CFSP, alliance building with the member states and the European 
Commission is indispensable. 
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Ashton’s dual-hatted position makes the European Commission a natural ally. After the 
transfer of DG Relex and a large part of DG Development to the EEAS, the Commission 
decided to stay involved in the works of the PSC.v The two have already written a joint 
communication on the Southern Mediterranean (European Commission and High 
Representative, 2011) and are obliged to prepare joint proposals in the case of sanctions. The 
EEAS is bound by the Treaty to respect normal Commission procedure every time the HR 
acts in her capacities as Commission Vice-President (Art 18.4 TEU), i.e. with regards to 
external relations, excluding CFSP issues. The Commission has made it clear, e.g. in its 
“Vademecum on Working Relations with the European External Action Service” (European 
Commission, 2011), that on those occasions all initiatives of the EEAS need to be prepared in 
cooperation with the relevant Commission services and must go through the inter-service 
consultation procedure. The sensitivity and complexity of the relationship is exemplified by 
the fact that it took one year to negotiate the practical guide on their mutual interaction 
(European Commission, 2012).  
 
The abovementioned consultation practice is already in place and the EEAS is fully included 
in the inter-service consultation tool, CIS-net. The scope for the EEAS to act in its capacity as 
support for the HR as a Vice-President for the Commission is a large part of its activities and 
includes Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and country papers. The EEAS 
also occasionally acts as a supporting service to different DGs in the Commission, for 
instance to the Commissioner responsible for the European Neighbourhood Policy regarding 
policy matters or to DG DEVCO for the strategic and multi-annual programming cycle 
(European Commission, 2011: 11-12). 
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The interviewed officials from the Commission insist that while the every-day co-operation at 
the desk-officer level is mostly smooth, higher-level relationships of cooperation are more 
troubled (Interviews 9 and 12). The HR was supposed to chair the meetings of the External 
Relations Group of Commissioners, but after her repeated absence this role was taken over by 
the Commission President. The interviewees also mentioned that the agenda-management by 
the EEAS is still weak and that dossiers, even those that have been through the inter-service 
consultation procedures, tend to ‘get lost’ in the highest levels of the EEAS hierarchy. Some 
see the process as being slowed down by Ashton’s insistence on controlling the dossiers. 
Others point to the inability of the HR cabinet to deal with dossiers effectively.  
 
The relations with the member states are still tense overall. There are continuous complaints 
about the late delivery of agendas and documents (Interviews 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12). National 
diplomats point out that often the discussions in the PSC are rather shallow, as the 
Ambassadors are simply not given enough time to consult with their capitals (Interviews 7 
and 8). The member states also complain about the lack of interest on the part of the HR in the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (see below). On the other hand, EEAS 
officials complain that member states often push for their ‘pet’ issues, when choices have to 
be made. There is a lot of informal lobbying, also at the level of the HR and her cabinet. 
Recently, several member states have used the ‘Any Other Business’ (AOB) agenda item in 
order to raise issues. On the positive side, the EEAS officials interviewed reported that some 
Foreign Ministers, e.g. from Belgium and Sweden, asked the HR for briefing before their trips 
to third countries or enquired whether there was any message they could deliver in the name 
of the EU. An overall good atmosphere was also reported after the FAC meetings, which is 
not always the case in preparatory bodies such as COREPER II or the PSC. 
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Even though the HR and the EEAS took over most of the duties of the rotating Presidency in 
external relations, the Presidency continues to be an important partner for several reasons. 
Firstly, it still chairs COREPER II, which as the ‘mother of all committees’ prepares the 
agenda and the draft conclusions for the FAC. There are many crosscutting issues such as 
sanctions where coordination is simply indispensable. Secondly, the country holding the 
Presidency is an information-hub and has a good overview of the member states’ positions in 
many of the dossiers. Finally, they have a designated budget for their time in office and can 
support the EEAS for example by replacing them at various meetings (bilateral summits, 
meetings in the European Parliament or trips to third countries).  
 
The Presidencies themselves employ different strategies of dealing with the EEAS. The 
Belgians (second half of 2010) and the Hungarians (first half of 2011) were rather withdrawn 
and had decided to remain in the shadow of the Service. The Hungarian Presidency even 
rejected the EEAS pledge to chair the meetings in the Council, until the EEAS would appoint 
their own officials to take over. Still, no matter what the strategy, each Presidency has its own 
priorities in external relations and lobbies the EEAS for putting them on the agenda Hungary 
for example prioritised the relationship with the Western Balkans and the organisation of the 
Western Balkan Forum. Despite the HR’s initial lack of enthusiasm the event took place in 
June 2010 in Luxembourg (Interviews 6 and 7). The Polish Presidency was more pro-active 
and vocal in expressing its political agenda. They put a heavy emphasis on the Eastern 
Partnership and its summit in Warsaw in September 2010. The EEAS expressed its objections 
and tried (unsuccessfully) to prevent the traditional PSC trip planned by the Polish Presidency 
to Moldova and Ukraine (Interview 8), a move that can be considered an attempt to set the 
agenda.  
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As for the other member states, the biggest players are traditionally more engaged, especially 
the United Kingdom and France, also sitting at the UN Security Council. The Middle East 
Peace Process and Iran are by now typical issues that are prioritised by the HR and where 
there is close coordination with the bigger member states. At the same time the interviewees 
have referred to an on-going power struggle. Each member state tries to influence the agenda 
so that it mirrors their concerns. In June 2012, the UK insisted on including Pakistan among 
the discussion points at the FAC and even lobbied for Council Conclusions on this topic, 
something the HR and the EEAS were not prepared to agree on easily. France had pushed for 
a greater interest in the Sahel, while countries like the UK and Denmark have been active in 
drawing attention to antipiracy measures. Other countries also have chances of putting items 
on the agenda. In July 2012, Poland raised a point that was immediately accepted by the 
EEAS, namely that the situation in Lebanon should be put on the PSC agenda. While this 
attitude is appreciated by member states, they also point out that the Service should be more 
pro-active.  
 
In sum, there is definitely room for improvement in the process of mobilising supporters as a 
step towards effective agenda setting. While co-operation with the Presidencies so far has 
been rather good, relations with the European Commission, especially at the higher levels of 
the hierarchy, could benefit from more attention and cooperation. In the Council, it is in the 
first place the member states mobilising the HR and the EEAS for their own priorities and 
preferences rather than vice versa. 
 
AROUSING INTEREST 
A second way for the HR and the EEAS to gain attention is by linking EU action to broader 
international objectives or to particular strengths of the EU as an external actor. When 
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assuming her position, Catherine Ashton could depart from an already well-established 
narrative. The EU’s documents often portray the Union as an example of successful 
international cooperation and as a soft or normative power, exerting influence through 
cooperation rather than coercion (Council of the EU, 2003; Manners 2010). 
 
From the start of her tenure, the HR strongly tied in with this vision of the EU as a ‘civilising 
force’. Already in her hearing before the EP in January 2010, she referred to the EU’s 
engagement ‘to promote peace, to protect the vulnerable, to fight poverty and to address the 
many challenges of our time’.vi In a speech at Corvinus University in Budapest in February 
2011, she described the EU as ‘a soft power with a hard edge – more than the power to set an 
example and to promote its values. But less than the power to impose its will’ (Catherine 
Ashton 2011). Further important dimensions of her narrative are globalisation and the rise of 
new powers. She argued that both developments ask for more unity amongst the member 
states and more integrated strategies, two requirements for which the HR and her service are 
well-equipped to contribute (see e.g. her speech at the Athens Concert Hall, July 2010).vii            
 
Besides embedding her role in the broader frame of EU external action, Ashton also used her 
first year in-office to convince the member states of the importance of specific priorities such 
as the policy towards EU’s neighbours and the development of the strategic partnerships 
(Ibid.). The message seems to have gotten across, since all interviewees at Coreper, the PSC 
and the Commission were very well aware of these priority fields. 
 
It remains to be asked to what extent Ashton has been able to act as a driving force in arising 
interest in the above-mentioned areas. The balance sheet is rather mixed. In the period 
between 2010 and mid-2012, relations with the neighbours were indeed heavily debated, but 
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this was rather due to the Arab Spring than to Ashton’s capacity to set the tone. Although the 
‘jasmine revolutions’ were ideal focusing events for the HR and her service to assert 
themselves, they initially remained passive. The HR was amongst the last to visit Tunis and 
was ‘painfully slow’ in responding to the events in Egypt.viii Rather than taking the lead, she 
waited for a mandate of the 27 member states. Similarly, in the case of Libya, the tone was set 
by the big member states, provoking Howorth (2011) to conclude that ‘she was, in many 
ways, instrumental in ensuring that (…) the EU took a backseat to its own Member States, to 
the US and NATO’. The most positive example from the neighbourhood, where the HR and 
her staff were able to play a proactive role, is the Western Balkans. Together with a small 
team around EEAS senior counsellor Robert Cooper, Ashton managed to play a substantial 
role in easing tensions between Kosovo and Serbia and in forging an agreement on integrated 
border management and Kosovo regional representation (Interview 3). 
 
Ashton’s efforts to arouse interest in strategic partnerships, her other priority, has been 
limited. Her input into the special European Council (October 2010) on relations with the 
strategic partners was disappointing, leading the Belgian Presidency and the cabinet of Van 
Rompuy to step into the vacuum (Interview 4). This mode has continued after the summit, 
and no further major initiatives have been taken since.   
 
The dossiers that the HR has attempted to keep off the policy agenda are as important as the 
dossiers for which she has tried to arise interest. Observers unanimously point to crisis 
management as the case in point (Interviews 2, 3). While under Solana more than 20 civilian 
and military missions were launched (2003 – 2009), the role of the EU as a crisis manager has 
almost come to a standstill. No major new missions have been launched and the HR shows 
very little interest with the existing ones. According to observers, this has to do with a lack of 
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personal interest as well as with her British background. The establishment of a Brussels-
based EU-Civil-Military Operations Centre for the Horn of Africa for example, only came 
after heavy pressure from the Polish Presidency and from France (Pomorska and 
Vanhoonacker 2012). Although this is a negative example, it shows how the HR and EEAS 
are in a powerful position to steer debates and lay particular accents on the development of 
CFSP. 
 
This brief overview shows that Ashton has very much embedded her European foreign policy 
discourse in the traditional narrative of Europe as a ‘soft power’, with a special emphasis on 
the neighbourhood and the strategic partnerships. While the latter topic has not yet received 
much attention, relations with the Mediterranean borderlands have been omnipresent. 
However, this is less the product of a well-developed strategy than of the unexpected 
revolutionary events in the region. Despite the receptive political climate and the general 
recognition that EU action was required, Ashton and her staff shied away from a pro-active 
approach, preferring to wait for a mandate from the member states.     
 
CONCLUSION 
By giving the HR and her staff the formal right to put forward policy proposals, the Lisbon 
Treaty has, at least on paper, created a potentially important new foreign policy entrepreneur. 
Being an influential agenda-setter, however, does not come automatically. It requires skilful 
use of a repertoire of different strategies both in terms of venues and framing. Applying a 
model by Princen (2011) on agenda-strategies in the EU and taking into account the 
particularities of European foreign policy, this article has explored the strategies used by the 
new EU foreign policy chief and her staff to build credibility and gain attention. 
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Of all four strategies, the HR has undoubtedly invested the most in capacity building. This is 
not a surprise since the new diplomatic service had to be established from scratch and a well-
equipped organisation was imperative to become operational. Ashton proved to be a skilful 
negotiator and despite the diverging views amongst the parties involved she managed to get 
the service off the ground within the first year of her appointment. However the recruitment 
of national diplomats, understaffing and budgetary capacity remain important challenges. 
 
The second strategy of claiming authority has proved more difficult. Although the Treaty 
gives her important powers in terms of agenda setting, the new HR clearly suffered from her 
lack of foreign policy expertise. Especially in her first year in office, there were several gaffes 
and misjudgements, leading some observers to wonder whether she was up to the job. In 
addition, she was criticised for not being forceful enough vis-à-vis dissenting member states. 
Unfortunately, the personal deficiencies of the HR were only partly compensated by the new 
service. A tremendous source of both content and process expertise, the EEAS suffered from 
the diverse professional backgrounds of its members, the absence of standard operating 
procedures, and the lack of an esprit de corps. 
 
Successful agenda-setters rarely have the luxury to act on their own. They have to mobilise 
allies and sideline opponents. Given the HR’s dual-hatted role, the European Commission is a 
natural partner. At lower levels the cooperation is taking shape well but higher in the 
hierarchy it continues to be rather problematic. Relations with the member states vary but 
tend to be competitive. National capitals have not lost their old habits to get on their particular 
hobbyhorses. However, since the formal agenda of meetings is drafted by the EEAS, it is in a 
powerful position to resist demands and it does so regularly. A clear example is CSDP, where 
the HR, to the frustration of many, has managed to keep a minimal agenda. Overall, the 
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rotating chair remains a privileged partner of cooperation, as it continues to chair COREPER 
II and replaces the HR if she is not available. If the priorities of the rotating chair and the HR 
coincide, they can be a powerful alliance. If not, as was the case of the Polish Presidency 
pushing for further steps in CSDP, this can lead to power struggles. 
 
Finally, we looked at how the HR and the EEAS have tried to raise interest. Ashton has not 
shunned away from situating her role in that of the broader context of the EU as a soft power 
and the rapidly changing international context of emerging new powers. She has also 
managed to clearly articulate her foreign policy priorities of establishing the EEAS, fostering 
close relations with the EU’s neighbourhood and strategic partnerships. The way these 
priorities have been followed-up by both the HR and the EEAS however has been 
unconvincing. 
 
In contrast to the sometimes extremely negative reviews in the press, our balance sheet is 
more nuanced. Overall, the strategies aimed at building credibility have been most developed. 
Given the fact that we look at the agenda-setting role of a new player this should not come as 
a surprise. Neither should we be amazed that this process was full of hurdles. Overcoming 
some of them, like the development of an EEAS esprit de corps, may be only a question of 
time, but others, such as the lack of budget and understaffing, may be more structural, 
especially in a period of financial crisis. The strategies aimed at gaining attention, have 
proven more difficult to materialise. The HR and the EEAS have been more preoccupied with 
internal problems than with investing efforts in mobilising possible partners and thinking in 
terms of framing particular foreign policy issues. This choice can be understood in the light of 
the recent character of the EU’s diplomatic system but if these players want to develop into 
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fully-fledged foreign policy entrepreneurs, they will have to give absolute priority to further 
investment into these strategies. 
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NOTES 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i The authors used secondary literature, documentary analysis and empirical evidence 
obtained from twelve semi-structured interviews with fourteen officials, conducted in 
Brussels at the end of 2011 and in 2012. The officials were based in the EEAS, in national 
Permanent Representations to the European Union and in the European Commission. All 
interviews were coded and are anonymous. 
ii For a verbatim report of the hearing on 11 January 2010, see: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/static/commissioners/cre/ashton.pdf 
iii Here, we refer to the formal arrangements as envisaged by the Treaty and the legal right of 
the HR to propose actions. However, as will be shown later in the article, in practice the role 
of HR is not as autonomous as it could be derived from the Treaty text and the HR’s power to 
launch initiatives and implement policies is shared with the Commission and the member 
states. 
iv To give three examples, she was criticized for not flying to Haiti after the earthquake 
(January 2010); for visiting Ukraine instead of attending an informal meeting of EU defence 
ministers (February 2010) and for missing the EU-Morocco summit in Granada.  
v The F3 Unit in the Secretariat General of the Commission hosts the PSC Representative and 
the Commission’s member of the Nicolaides group. 
vi See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/static/commissioners/cre/ashton.pdf 
vii See: http://www.nieuwsbank.nl/en/2010/07/11/H002.htm 
viii See e.g. S. Erlanger (2011) ‘Europe’s foreign policy chief, struggling for mandate, faces 
criticism on uprisings’, New York Times, 10 February 2011. 
